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When Lawyers Were Serial Killers:

Nineteenth Century Visions of Good Moral

Character
ROGER ROOTS*

INTRODUCTION

The requirement that applicants to the bar possess "good moral
character," although well-established in American law today, appears to be
a relatively recent arrival to Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. For much of
American history attorneys distinguished themselves, not by good works
and saintly disposition, but by acts of violence that would confine them to
imprisonment if committed in modem America. This article provides a
number of examples of attorneys who shot, stabbed, and assaulted their
way into professional prominence in the 1800s. The illumination of this
forgotten record of professional incivility and violence says much about
how perceptions of professionalism have changed over the course of
American legal history.
The phrase "good moral character" appears for the first time in
nineteenth century American bar admission statutes but probably dates to
English precedents.1
Similar standards of qualification may have
originated in seventeenth century England with an act requiring that
lawyers be "skilfull" and "honest."2 Although an official roll of English
solicitors was introduced in 1728, 3 anyone could call himself a solicitor

* Roger Isaac Roots, J.D., is director of the Prison Crisis Project, a not-for-profit
criminal justice think tank based in Providence, Rhode Island. He is a 1999 graduate of the
Ralph R. Papitto School of Law at Roger Williams University in Bristol, Rhode Island.
1.
See, e.g., THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, THE BAR
EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK 15 (Stuart Duhl ed., 2d ed. 1980) (reprinting Indiana's 1851
constitutional requirement that "every person of good moral character, being a voter, shall
be entitled to admission to practice law in all courts of justice").
2.
See S.H. BAILEY & M.J. GUNN, SMITH & BAILEY ON THE MODERN ENGLISH
LEGAL SYSTEM 115 (3d ed. 1996) (referring to a 1605 statute).
3. See id.
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until 1874 when Parliament passed a statute penalizing the unauthorized
practice of law.4
The relationship between the English bar and the royal family played
an important role in the adoption of "character" as a professional
requirement of lawyers in England. By 1750 the basic structure of the
English legal profession had developed to differentiate between barristers
and solicitors.5 The first group enjoyed exclusive access to the highest
6
It was
courts and rarely dealt with members of the public directly.
composed entirely of members of the upper classes and nobility, yet its
members occasionally couched their exclusivity in terms of personal
integrity and character.7 "Apart from these caste-bound restraints, the
profession's upper branch made little systematic effort to probe the
personal attributes of its members." 8
Admission to the lower (solicitor) branch was open to a wider
segment of the population. In 1874, Parliament passed a statute requiring
9
apprenticeship and examination of fitness by the courts. This screening
process, although facially egalitarian, evolved by 1860 to differentiate
°
Even these heightened
lawyers from the lowest English rabble.'

English law provided no penalty against unlicensed persons practicing law until
4.
1874. See BRIAN ABEL-SMITH & ROBERT STEVENS, LAWYERS AND THE COURTS: A
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 1750-1965 62 (1967). Each court
maintained its own roll of attorneys. See id. at 24 n.2. The court could allow anyone to
practice before it without legal penalty. Id. at 20 (recounting that no penalty was provided
for persons who broke the solicitors' monopoly). Unlicensed individuals apparently drew
up much litigation during the 1700s, prompting complaints from educated lawyers that
"many illiterate and unqualified Men have intruded themselves [into the legal profession] to
the great Prejudice of the Public by the Promoting of Litigation and the Disgrace of the

profession of the Law." See id. at 23 n. 1 (citing E.B.V.
SOLICITORS 155 (1896)).
5.
6.

See id. at 7.
See generally

WILFRID

HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BAR

CHRISTIAN,

A

SHORT HISTORY OF

R. PREST, THE RISE OF THE BARRISTERS:

A SOCIAL

1590-1640 8 (1991) (explaining the difference in status

between solicitors and barristers).
Cf id. at 48 (quoting seventeenth-century barrister who regarded the profession
7.
as an especially honest and sacred pursuit).
8. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE
L.J. 491, 495 (1985). Until the second half of the nineteenth century, the only qualification
a barrister needed was to be admitted at one of the inns of court. See CHRISTOPHER W.
BROOKS, LAWYERS, LITIGATION AND ENGLISH SOCIETY SINCE 1450 145 (1998).
See Rhode, supra note 8, at 495; see also id. at 495 n.10.
9.
In 1860, Parliament enacted the Solicitors Act, requiring a preliminary
10.
examination for all men seeking admission to the bar. The Solicitors'Journalremarked in
August 1863 that the clear purpose of the examination was "to exclude from the profession
all who are not gentlemen by birth and education." BRIAN ABEL-SMITH & ROBERT STEVENS,
LAWYERS AND THE COURTS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 1750-
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admission requirements, however, yielded few or no reported cases of
denial on character grounds. 1
I. T-E EARLY AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION
In early America, the character requirement for attorneys came about
inlarge part as a compromise between the legal profession and those who
sought to ban the profession from American soil.' 2 However, an
exhaustive 1985 study financed by the Stanford Legal Research Fund
found "almost no instances of denial of admission on character-related
grounds" in the nineteenth century. 13 Requirements for entry into the
profession were few, and almost anyone who desired to practice law could
advertise himself as capable of doing so.' 4 John Adams remarked in his
diary that he once came upon a tavern keeper who moonlighted as "a sort
of Lawyer among [tavern patrons] ... plead[ing] some of their home Cases

before the Justices and Arbitrators" of the region. 1' Tocqueville wrote in
the 1830s that he often came, across "those who have been in turn lawyers,
farmers, merchants, ministers of the Gospel, and doctors."' 16
Although "good moral character" was required to practice law under
the laws of most states by the end of the nineteenth century, the character
mandate had little practical impact. "Affidavits from personal references
generally satisfied admission requirements, and such documents were

1965, 67 n.6 (1967).
11.
The determination of fitness to practice as either a solicitor or a barrister was
made by the Inns of Court, precursors of modem bar associations, which functioned as
strange combinations of social clubs and professional associations. A person denied
admission by one Inn might apply and be granted admission by another. Only in 1837 did
admission to the Inns of Court come under the review of the courts. See id. at 64. In 1837,
the four Inns formally agreed to allow persons refused admission to an Inn the right to
appeal to the courts and to hold themselves bound by judges' decisions. See id.
12.
Cf Rhode, supra note 8 at 496 (stating legislation imposing character
requirements for admission to the bar was passed against the backdrop of public animus
against lawyers).
13.
Id. at 497. ("[T]he anecdotal evidence available suggests that few candidates
were foreclosed from practice for character deficiencies." ).
14.
See Daniel R. Hansen, Note, Do We Need the Bar Examination?A Critical
Evaluation of the Justificationsfor the Bar Examination and Proposed Alternatives, 45
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1191, 1195 (1995) (stating that nineteenth-century admission
standards permitted virtually any man to practice law).
15.
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN CURRENTS INAMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 6 (1993)
(quoting 2 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 27 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 196 1).
16.
ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 403 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1988) (1966).
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The first federal rule governing bar admission
easily obtained."' 7
that an' 18 applicant's private and professional
only
required
apparently
fair."
be
to
appear
"shall
character

There was one major exception to open membership. Women were

generally barred from the practice under a rationale that seems entirely
contrary to the prevailing mores of the modem bar: they were seen as too
timid, delicate, and polite to practice law.' 9 United States Supreme Court
Justice Stephen J. Field (a man who was arrested and disbarred more than
once during his own career)20 was willing to allow a lynch mob killer to
practice law2' but concluded that women should be barred from the practice
to the
because the "natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs 22
civil life.",
of
occupations
the
of
many
for
it
unfits
evidently
sex
female
II. DUELING

The practice of law was a vocation that demanded both skill and
courage and seemed to attract a fire-breathing and intemperate breed of
These unwritten requirements of the profession manifested
man.
themselves with unique clarity in a cultural practice that distracted the
profession for much of the early nineteenth century. Dueling cost the lives
of hundreds of Americans in early America, including several of the
country's most prominent citizens, including U.S. Secretary of Treasury

Rhode, supra note 7, at 497-98.
17.
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 336 (1866) (emphasis in original).
18.
After the Civil War, Congress amended the admission statute to require attorneys to swear
an oath that they had given no aid or held no office under "any authority or pretended
authority in hostility to the United States"--effectively disbarring every attorney who had
practiced law under the Confederacy. Id. at 335 (citing Act of Jan. 24, 1865, ch. 20, 13
STAT. 424 (1865)). This oath requirement was struck down as unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court. Id. at 381. Justice Miller dissented from the ruling, however, claiming that
"fidelity to the government under which [an attorney] lives, a true and loyal attachment to it,
and a sincere desire for its preservation, are among the most essential qualifications which
should be required in a lawyer." Id. at 385 (Miller, J., dissenting). Miller went on to say that
"if all the members of the legal profession in the States lately in insurrection had possessed
the qualification of a loyal and faithful allegiance to the government, we should have been
spared the horrors of that Rebellion." Id. at 386 (Miller, J., dissenting).
See Rhode, supra note 8, at 497.
19.
See infra notes 60-84, and accompanying text.
20.
See Exparte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 290 (1883) (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that
21.
an attorney who evidently led a lynch mob attack on a courthouse and hanged a suspect in a
Tampa street should retain his license on grounds of procedural improprieties).
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
22.
concurring) (joined by Field, J.).
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Alexander Hamilton, at the hands of Vice President and fellow attorney
Aaron Burr; 23 U.S. Senator Armistead Mason of Virginia;2 4 U.S.
Congressman and lawyer Jonathan Cilley of Maine, at the hands of U.S.
Congressman and lawyer William Graves of Kentucky; 25 Arkansas' first
delegate to Congress Henry Conway, at the hands of Arkansas' first
Territorial Secretary Robert Crittenden; 26 U.S. Congressman and lawyer
Spencer Pettis of Missouri; 27 and U.S. Senator David Broderick of
California, at the hands of California's Chief Justice David Terry.28
In response to the scourge of dueling, the Tennessee legislature led the
nation in 1801 by passing a law making dueling a crime and requiring
lawyers, upon being admitted to the bar, to take an oath that they would not
engage in dueling. 29 This prohibition was prompted by a finding that about
ninety percent of duels in Tennessee were fought between attorneys, and
that special measures were needed to curb their combativeness. 30 The
aforementioned duel between Representatives Graves and Cilley (both
lawyers) prompted a similar ban in the District of Columbia in 1839."'

23.
The infamous 1804 duel between Hamilton and Burr (both lawyers) is
described in unique detail in DON C. SEITZ, FAMOUS AMERICAN DUELS: WITH SOME
ACCOUNT OF THE CAUSES THAT LED UP TO THEM AND THE MEN ENGAGED 77-106 (1966).
24.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774-1996 1454 (1996) [hereinafter BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY].
25.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774-1989 777 (Bicentennial ed. 1989).

26.
Lynn Foster, Their Pride and Ornament: Judge Benjamin Johnson and the
FederalCourts in Early Arkansas, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 21, 31 (1999).
27.

HAMILTON COCHRAN, NOTED AMERICAN DUELS AND HOSTILE ENCOUNTERS 135

28.

See infra note 66 and accompanying text.

(1963). Pettis (an attorney) died along with his opponent, Major Thomas Biddle, in a duel
on an island in the Mississippi River at the "astoundingly short distance of five feet" in
1831. Id.
29.
30.
31.

See SEITZ, supra note 23, at 30.
See id.
See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY, supra note 24, at 1086-87.
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Attorneys were known to draw weapons over accusations that they
misstated evidence in the record,32 or that they engaged in professional
"pettifoggery." 33 One young Tennessee lawyer fatally stabbed a sketch
artist after the artist drew him in a humorous and satirical fashion. 34 An
Arkansas superior court judge killed another Arkansas superior court judge
in a duel after the latter judge offended the former's wife during a card
game. 35 Abraham Lincoln, one of America's greatest trial lawyers, as well
as our sixteenth President, was forced to the very brink of a saber duel with
the Illinois state auditor (another lawyer) after Lincoln was identified as the
author of embarrassing newspaper articles written under alias in 1842.36
avoided violence only by apologizing in the moments before the
Lincoln
37
duel.
The first duel recorded in Rhode Island took place in 1806 after a
Massachusetts attorney took offense to a newspaper article drafted by
another lawyer under another assumed name. 38 Twenty-eight years later, a
Harvard law student dueled with a Boston businessman39near the same
Providence ground-apparently over the honor of a woman.

In 1816, St. Louis attorney Thomas H. Benton was arguing a case in front of the
32.
Missouri Supreme Court when the opposing attorney, Charles Lucas, accused Benton of
misstating the evidence in the record. See SEITZ, supra note 23, at 169. Challenges to a duel
soon followed. See id. at 169-70. Benton dispatched his rival attorney with a bullet to the
heart on their second duel and was subsequently elected to the United States Senate. See id.
at 173.
See Clayton L. Peeples, Death of Dueling Shows Power of the Law (visited Jan.
33.
1, 2001) http://www.da28.com/columns/duel.htm (on file with. author) (recounting Andrew
Jackson's challenge of Tennessee Governor John Sevier after Sevier made such an
accusation). Pettifoggery is defined as engaging in petty, shifty, or insignificant legal
practice. WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1450 (Updated rev. deluxe ed. 1996).
See DICK STEWARD, DUELS AND THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE IN MISSOURI 88
34.
(2000). Although the lawyer was indicted for murder, his attorneys argued he was
defending his honor against Yankee disrespect, and a jury acquitted him. See id. at 88-89.
See Lynn Foster, Their Pride and Ornament:Judge Benjamin Johnson and the
35.
Federal Courts in Early Arkansas, 22 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REv. 21, 30 (1999)
(recounting a duel between Judge Andrew Scott and Judge Joseph Selden in 1824).
36.' See COCHRAN, supra note 27, at 126-27.
37.
See id. at 128.
See ROGER TILLINGHAST CLAPP, DUELING IN RHODE ISLAND (AND ELSEWHERE)
38.
19 (1977). The duel took place in Providence at a point which is now Constance Witherby
Park between Pitman and Waterman Streets. See id.
See id. at 24.
39.
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One Vicksburg, Mississippi attorney, Alexander McClung, killed as
many as fourteen men in duels during his violent life.4 ° Marksmanship
may have been McClung's one true virtue, as he was otherwise despised
for his ill manners, bad credit, gambling, and drunkenness. 41 His mother
42
was the sister of the great United States Chief Justice John Marshall.
Legislative prohibitions against dueling posed little obstacle to the
most obstinate nineteenth century duelists. Lawyers in states with strong
anti-dueling laws simply arranged their skirmishes to take place on ground
without such laws. "Indian country" served this purpose in states such as
Georgia, while the many islands of the Mississippi River, over which no
state held clear jurisdiction, made ideal dueling grounds for Illinoisans and
Missourians.43 Rhode Island was apparently seen as a dueling haven
among surrounding states because of its relatively lax dueling laws in the
early 1800s. 44
Dueling culture was particularly strong among the elite bar and bench
of Georgia in the first decade of the nineteenth century. One Georgia
Superior Court judge, Charles Tait, challenged an attorney named Peter
Van Alen to a duel in 1806 after the attorney placed into the record of a
civil case some foolish letters written by the judge to the attorney's client.45
The attorney declined to duel on the ground that Judge Tait was not a
gentleman (a requirement of the duelers' code), angering the judge even
further. 46 In response, Judge Tait had his good friend William Crawford
deliver a renewed challenge complete with public formalities.47 But
Crawford, an attorney known for slightness of frame and disposition, was
immediately challenged to a duel by Van Alen48 - an overture no doubt
wagered upon the expectation that the bookish Crawford would decline to
49
fight.

40. See WILLIAM 0. STEVENS, PISTOLS AT TEN PACES: THE STORY OF THE CODE OF
HONOR IN AMERICA 127 (1940). Among McClung's victims were seven members of one
family. See id. at 116.
41.
See id.
at 111-28.
42.
See id.
at 127.
43.
See STEWARD, supra note 34, at 14.
44.
See CLAPP, supra note 38, at 18. Rhode Island laws of the period punished
duelists only by publicly carrying them "in a cart to the gallows with a rope about his neck
and set thereon for the space of one hour," and possible imprisonment for a term not
exceeding one year. Id. at 18. In comparison, Massachusetts punished dueling as murder.
See id.
45.
See SEITZ, supra note 23, at 114.
46.
See Id.
47.
See Id.
48.
See id. at 107-122.
49.
See id.at 113.
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Surprising the local establishment, Crawford accepted the challenge
and arrived at the duel with no preparation whatsoever. 50 He owned no
weapons and carried a pair of borrowed pistols that had both misfired when
he tested them the morning of the duel. 51 At the signal, both adversaries
fired wildly. Van Alen's first and second shots missed, but Crawford's
found its mark, killing Van Alen. 2 Instead of disgrace, Crawford was met
with renewed professional approval after killing his rival attorney. He rode
to Washington as a United States Senator and ultimately became Minister
and Secretary of the Treasury under Presidents Madison and
to France
53
Monroe.

50.
See id. at 115.
See id.
51.
52.
SEITZ, supra note 23, at 115.
53.
See id. Crawford's renewed standing in the Georgia bar after killing Van Alen
was not to go unanswered. The fire-eating General John Clark, a famous fighter in the
Revolution and the Indian Wars, soon challenged Crawford to a duel over remarks made
during Judge Tait's 1804 campaign for the Georgia Supreme Court. Id. Clark was an expert
with arms, and Crawford took a great chance in accepting Clark's challenge. See id. at 116.
Moments before the Clark/Crawford duel began, Governor John Milledge appeared on the
scene and urged both sides to desist. Id. A "Court of Honor" composed of five "eminent
gentlemen" quickly found that the two men had been led to a dispute over trivial matters and
acquitted both men of any imputations of cowardice for not dueling. See id. at 117. The two
shook hands without firing a round. Id.
However, when Crawford's friend Judge Charles Tait challenged another
Georgia judge (and friend of Clark), John M. Dooly, to yet another duel, the heat was back
on between the factions. See id. at 118. Both Clark and Crawford reappeared to face each
other, this time as "seconds" for the duelers, whose duties consisted of watching for fair
compliance with the code of dueling by the parties. Id. When Dooly admitted he did not
want to fight, Crawford admonished that his cowardice would fill a column in the
newspapers that followed. Id. Judge Dooly, responded that he would rather fill two
newspapers than one coffin. Id. Laughter took the place of bloodshed, but the rivalry
between Crawford and Clark soured further. Two years after the Court of Honor intervened
between Crawford and Clark, their duel was in session anew. Id. The two met in Georgia's
Indian Country to settle their differences at high noon on December 16th, 1806. Id. at 120.
While Crawford's bullet missed its mark entirely, the noted marksman Clark struck
Crawford in the wrist, shattering it. Id. The injury would trouble Crawford throughout his
later career.
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III. VIOLENCE BY JUDGES

Just as modem judges reflect the strongest attributes of the modem bar
(generally, superior intellect, outstanding academic credentials, and
commanding disposition), the judges of the nineteenth century were the
embodiment of the most visible traits of the legal profession they oversaw.
Violence and intemperance predominated among them. One judge elected
to a Florida bench in the 1880s had led a lynch mob assault on a
courthouse. 4 The famous Texas jurist known as Judge Roy Bean began
his adult life as a drifting brawler, a two-time killer and a prison escapee.55
A failed lynching so injured Bean's neck that he was forever unable to turn
his head while sitting on the bench.56 California's fiery Chief Justice David
S. Terry engaged in violent brawls while presiding over the State Supreme
Court and was once imprisoned for stabbing a San Francisco man during an
argument.57 Only the man's recovery spared Justice Terry from trial and
probable execution for murder.58
One judge on the Court of Common Pleas in Missouri, known by the
unlikely name of John Smith T, was a killer of some fourteen men, "mainly
in duels. ' 59 A former military officer, Smith T was a crack shot with both
pistol and rifle and once killed the sheriff of Washington County, Missouri,
in a duel with a single shot to the brain. 60
The colorful life of Stephen J. Field, one of the longest-serving United
States Supreme Court justices and the architect of much of American
constitutional law in the late nineteenth century, is largely forgotten today.
But Field's past would have most likely barred him from entry to the
bench, if not the bar, by modem standards.

54.
See Rhode, supra note 8, at 498 n.23 (referring to a lawyer disbarred from
federal practice in Exparte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883)).
55.
See MIKE FLANAGAN, THE COMPLETE IDIOT'S GUIDE TO THE OLD WEST 290
(1999).
56.
See id.
57.
See CARL B. SWISHER & STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 74 (1963).
58.
See id.
59.
STEWARD, supra note 34, at 27, 175.
60.
See id. at 49-50.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22-1

Stephen J. Field was reared in Massachusetts but spent most of his
early adulthood amongst the gold-rush era bustle of the California frontier,
where he fought his way to the top of his profession with cutthroat
determinism. 6 1 In 1850, Field was jailed and disbarred by a local judge for
showing disrespect in the courtroom. 62 Afterward, Field wore a pistol
wherever he went in anticipation of a chance confrontation with the
judge.63 Field shadowed him in public streets and saloons, and sent a
provocative message that he was prepared to kill the judge if he "came at
[Field] in a threatening manner. '
Shortly after readmission to the bar,
Field was again disbarred for similar disrespect in the courtroom of the
same judge.65
Elected to the California Supreme Court in 1857, Field embarked on a
forty year career as one of the nation's premier jurists. After Chief Justice
David Terry stepped down from his seat to kill United States Senator David
Broderick in a duel, Field slid into the California Chief Judge's position.66
In 1863, Field was nominated to the United States Supreme Court by
Abraham Lincoln.67
As the Supreme Court's representative from the west, Field's duties
required him to journey to California once a year to perform supervisory
duties over the region's federal courts.68 By chance, Field happened to
preside as a circuit justice over a diversity case in 1888 involving Justice
David Terry and his wife.6 9 Field ruled against the Terrys in the celebrated
case, costing them a small fortune and prompting former Chief Justice
Terry to erupt in the courtroom with a knife. 70 Terry was jailed and
disbarred for contempt.7'
Due to the serious enmity between Terry and Field following the 1888
hearing, a contingent of United States Marshals flanked Field wherever he

61.
Field's own recollections of his early career were collected in a best-selling
autobiography in 1893. See generally STEPHEN J. FIELD, PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF
EARLY DAYS IN CALIFORNIA (1893).
62.
See SWISHER & FIELD, supra note 57, at 38-39 (1963). Field's offense
consisted of insisting to stand and speak in court after a California district judge ordered him
to be silent, and then calling the judge a "d----d old jackass." Id.
63.
See id. at 40-41.
64.
Id. at 40.
65.
See id. at 42-43.
66.
See id. at 73-75.
67.
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 308.
68.
See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 55-56 (1889).
69.
Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 297 (1888) (involving Terry's prosecution for
contempt of court).
70. See SWISHER & FIELD, supra note 57, at 333-34.
71.
See id. at 335-37.
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presided during his California tour of 1889.72 One marshal named David
Neagle acted as Field's personal bodyguard.73 Whether by fate or by
deliberation, Terry boarded a north-bound train carrying Field and Neagle
on August 14, 1889. 74 During a breakfast stop, the two aging adversaries
met at a railroad station diner in Lathrop, California. Judge Terry walked
up to Justice Field and punched him twice in the face, knocking Field off
his seat in front of a crowd of railway passengers.75 Neagle, at Field's side,
drew a gun and killed an unarmed Judge Terry with two shots. 76
Field and Neagle departed the scene before a lynch mob could
gather. 77 Arrest warrants, based on the complaint of Terry's wife, were
issued by a justice of the peace the next day.78 Stephen J. Field, a sitting
member of the United States Supreme Court, was arrested the following
afternoon inside the federal court building in San Francisco. 79 It was his
third arrest, and this time the charge was murder of a former chief justice of
the California Supreme Court. An immediate writ of habeas corpus was
issued by the federal circuit court. 80 Neagle, the bodyguard, was in worse
shoes. But a sizeable state/federal confrontation ensued, punctuated by the
federal courts' issuance of a writ in Neagle's favor to protect him from a
murder conviction (and probably an execution) in California state courts.8
This overreaching decision is immortalized in the case of In re Neagle,82
which still protects federal agents from paying for their crimes in state
courts to this day.83

72.
See Neagle, 135 U.S. at 48-51 (reprinting correspondence regarding the extra
security measures provided to Justice Field during 1889).
73.
See id. at 4-5.
See In re Neagle at 44.
74.
75.
See SWISHER& FIELD, supra note 57, at 348.
See id.
76.
77.
See id. at 349-350.
78.
See id. at 351.
79.
See id. at 352.
80.
See id.
81.
See id. at 355.
82.
135 U.S. 1 (1889).
83.
See Idaho v. Horiuchi, 215 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2000) (extending Neagle
immunity to federal sniper who killed Randy Weaver's wife during 1992 Ruby Ridge
standoff).
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IV. ANDREW JACKSON
The adventurous life of Justice Stephen J. Field might seem
unimaginable to modem lawyers, but it scarcely compares to an even more
vivid nineteenth century example of the bar's moral turbulence. Andrew
Jackson, America's seventh President, exemplified the traits of good
lawyering most respected by the bar of the nineteenth century: bravery,
84
brashness, and the ability to unleash violence upon the disrespectful.
Jackson volunteered in the Revolution at age thirteen and became a trial
lawyer in North Carolina by age twenty. He was also licensed in
Tennessee and, at one time, sat as a justice on the Tennessee Superior
Court.,,
While born and reared in poverty, Jackson was busy and prosperous as
an attorney. 86 His successes as a lawyer and judge, however, were equaled
by his record of violence, which included (in addition to his military
violence, which was considerable) at least 103 duels, fights, and
altercations. 87 His most celebrated (and perhaps most shameful) pistol
duel was with another prominent Tennessee attorney, Charles Dickinson.
The duel took place in 1806 on Kentucky soil to avoid the Tennessee antidueling statute.
Dickinson was a "snap-shooter," meaning he took no aim but fired by
instinct with great accuracy. 88 Jackson was also a good shot, but he
required aim. 89 Knowing this, the battle-hardened Jackson stood firm at the
signal and twisted his thin frame inside his large, loose garments. 9°
Dickinson's lone shot pierced Jackson through the side, barely missing
Jackson's heart. 9' Jackson then took slow and steady aim at the helpless
Dickinson (who tried to retreat backwards but was ordered to the mark by

84.
Jackson's lust for bloodshed and vengeance was of such legend that one
survivor of a scrape with Jackson predicted his own death would surely follow. "My life is
in danger," wrote Thomas H. Benton, "[n]othing but a decisive duel can save me, or even
give me a chance for my own existence ....I shall never be forgiven." SEITZ, supra note
23, at 165 (quoting from Benton's writings).
85.
See Joseph G. Tregle, Jr, Jackson, Andrew, 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 642
(1984).
86. See SEITZ, supra note 23, at 125.
87.
See SEITZ, supra note 23, at 123.
88.
See SEITZ, supra note 23, at 152.
89.
Id.
90.
Id. at 154.
91.
Id. at 155.
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referees).92 Jackson's pistol first misfired, but he was allowed to recock.
His second pull of the trigger sent a lead ball into the breast of Dickinson,
who died several hours later.93 Jackson concealed his own injury from
Dickinson's associates to spite Dickinson in his death. 94
Jackson's many dueling wounds tormented him throughout his entire
life. A recent study in the Journal of the American Medical Association
suggests President Jackson suffered long-term effects of lead poisoning
from the balls embedded in his body. 95
V. JOHN WESLEY HARDIN

Transcending even the example set by Andrew Jackson was that of the
infamous wild west gunslinger John Wesley Hardin. Hardin, known
affectionately as the "Dark Angel of Texas," murdered some thirty to forty
men in a criminal career that dated to his adolescence. 96 A fugitive at age
fifteen, Hardin roamed the cowtowns of east Texas engaging in murder,
mayhem, horse theft and cattle rustling. In a two-week period in 1871,
Hardin escaped from custody twice by killing four Texas officials. 97 By
the time of his capture at age twenty-four, Hardin had gunned down a
dozen Texas lawmen and probably at least one judge.98
In 1874 and 1875, Hardin was the subject of the greatest manhunt in
Texas history. 99 The State of Texas laid siege to Hardin's entire family,
lynching his brother and cousins from the limb of a tree, and offering four
thousand dollars for Hardin's death or capture.'0° Hardin was finally
arrested under the name John Swain on a Florida passenger train in 1877.10
Sentenced to twenty-five years in the Texas State Prison at Huntsville,
Hardin unsuccessfully plotted or attempted escape three times, once

Id. at 154.
92.
93.
Id. at 155-56.
See id. at 155 (quoting Jackson as saying he did not want Dickinson to have the
94.
gratification even of knowing that he had touched him).
95.
Ludwig M. Deppisch et al., Andrew Jackson'sExposure to Mercury and Lead:
PoisonedPresident?,282 JAMA 569-71 (1999).
96.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See LEON METZ, JOHN WESLEY HARD1N: DARK ANGEL OF TEXAS (1996).

See id. at 32-33.
See id. at 21 (attributing the death of Judge Moore in 1869 to Hardin).
Id. at 142.
See id. at 146-61.
See id. at 168-69.
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intending 02to "resist all opposition" by means of two smuggled sixshooters. 1
While Hardin served his 1878 sentence, his attorneys scrambled to
quell attempts to prosecute him for other crimes. Hardin had barely
avoided the hangman's noose because of a plausible self-defense argument
in the murder case for which he was sentenced. In his thirteenth year of
confinement, Hardin was formally charged with a murder committed
eighteen years earlier. 10 3. He pled guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced
to an additional two years.1°4
Despite Hardin's less-than-model conduct as a prisoner, his recent
conviction, and the existence of other pending indictments against him,
Hardin was pardoned by Texas governor James Hogg in 1894.105 He was
released at the age of forty, after serving slightly more than fifteen years in
prison. 106 Barely five months later, a committee of attorneys examined
and found Hardin qualified to practice law in the state of Texas. 10 7 Several
indictments remained pending against him, but none were ever
prosecuted.108
Hardin's practice as an attorney consisted of representing defendants
in two murder cases and "the usual civil entanglements" known to the
locality.10 9 One case led to extensive hearings in El Paso and required
Hardin to pack up and move his practice to the dusty west Texas border
city. The El Paso Times announced Hardin's arrival by describing him as
"John Wesley Hardin, Esq., a leading member of the Pecos City bar"'"10 and
a firm man who "never yields except to reason and the law."'' I

102.

JOHN W. HARDIN, THE LIFE OF JOHN WESLEY HARDIN, As WRITTEN By HIMSELF

129 (1961).
103.
See Barry Crouch, "That Good Citizens Ask It": The Pardon of John Wesley
Hardin (visited Nov. 27, 2000) http://www.webdots.com/nola/JohnWesleyHardin.htm, at 7
(on file with author).
104.
See id. at 10.
HARDIN, supra note 102, at 136 (reprinting text of original pardon).
105.
106.
METZ, supra note 97, at 208.
107.
Seeid. at 211.
108.
See id. at 204 (speaking of "indictments scattered around Texas").
109.
Id. at 211.
110.
Seeid. at 232.
111.
See id. at 233.
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VI. PROFESSIONAL "CIVILITY" IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

While noted legal scholars of our day decry the lack of civility among
members of the bar, and even reminisce about a bygone era when such
civility allegedly reigned, 1 2 a less wistful purview of the historical record
suggests that "civility" was equally rare (if not more so) among the
nineteenth century bar. The practice of law in the nineteenth century,
especially in frontier jurisdictions, was dangerous work, and attorneys
contributed to the danger. One distinguished Louisiana attorney left the
Missouri bar, citing the practice of dueling and the need to be armed at all
times as two of his principal reasons.' 13 Judges and lawyers in western
regions at times even encouraged disappointed litigants to seek redress
through violence outside the courtroom. Thus wild brawls and bloody
feuds were played out in the countryside wherever and whenever frontier
'1 14
courts were in session, becoming part of the "unofficial court docket."
Even the halls of legislatures were no havens from the gunplay and
violence of lawyers. United States Senator Henry Foote, an attorney from
Mississippi, once drew a pistol on fellow attorney Senator Thomas Benton
in the very chambers of the national Senate.' 1 5 The number of beatings,
canings, and stabbings in and near the halls of Congress by members of
that body far surpasses the record of pistol duels already mentioned.
The most famous pummeling of this sort took place in the chambers of
the United States Senate in 1856 when South Carolina Senator Preston
Brooks (an attorney) mercilessly beat Senator Charles Sumner (an attorney
and former Harvard Law School lecturer) with a cane. The beating was so
severe that Brooks' cane broke across Sumner's head after thirty strikes
and Sumner was left an invalid for several years.' 1 6 Governor (and future
United States Senator) James Jackson, a gifted attorney with a thriving
practice in Georgia, engaged in a rough-and-tumble fight on the steps of the
Georgia State Capitol in 1796, which began with pistols and ended with

112.
See generally, STEPHEN L. CARTER, CIVILITY: MANNERS, MORALS, AND THE
ETIQUETTE OF DEMOCRACY 38-55 (1998).
113.
See STEWARD, supra note 34, at 89.

114.
Id. at 137.
115.
See STEVENS, supra note 40, at 184. Foote practiced law throughout the South
and was appointed superintendent of the national mint at New Orleans by President
Rutherford B. Hayes after the Civil War. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY, supra note 24, at
1013.
116.
See STEVENS, supra note 40, at 104-05.
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biting, stabbing, and gouging. 1 7 A month later, Jackson and his opponent,
apparently also an attorney,
engaged in another brawl outside the federal
18
district court in Atlanta).'
CONCLUSION

Although the lives of such men as Hardin, Jackson, and Bean
generated an immense historical literature, the record seems bare of any
attempts at barring or disbarring such individuals from the practice of law
for their activities outside the courtroom.
Denial of admission and
disbarment were generally reserved for courtroom-related conduct or for
serious crimes committed in the course of practicing law.'19
Although general rules of professional conduct have perhaps changed
little in 150 years, the screening of litigators to discern their fundamental
character is a product of the nativism of the twentieth century. "Much of
the initial impetus for more stringent character scrutiny," according to Yale
law professor Deborah Rhode, "arose in response to an influx of Eastern
European immigrants, which threatened the profession's public
standing.' 20
By the 1920s, states began to create "moral fitness

117.

See WILLIAM 0. FOSTER SR., JAMES JACKSON: DUELIST AND MILITANT
127-28 (1960). Jackson was a hero of the Revolution and a leading
Jeffersonian in Congress during the Adams and Jefferson administrations. During his rise to
political prominence, he engaged in a number of duels and killed one man in an alleged duel
of which he was the only surviving witness. See id. at 6.
118.
See id. at 128. The two eventually settled their differences in a duel in 1800,
resulting in a near-fatal injury to Governor Jackson. See id. at 129-30.
119.
Cf Exparte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 272-74 (1883). "[Wlhere an attorney has been
fraudulently admitted, or convicted (after admission) of felony, or other offence which
renders him unfit to be continued an attorney, . . . the court will order him to be struck off
the roll." Id. at 273 (quoting English authority). In order to disbar an attorney on account of
non-felonious criminal conduct, the courts had to establish that the conduct related to court
activities. Thus, the Supreme Court stressed the vicinity to the courthouse steps of a Florida
lawyer's crime when upholding his disbarment in 1883. See id. at 274 (saying the attorney's
conduct was perpetrated at the courthouse door "in the virtual presence of the court!"). The
same nineteenth century perception of disbarment can be seen in the case of Ex parte
Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364 (1868), involving the disbarment of an attorney who
defended John Suratt, an accused murderer of Abraham Lincoln. While the Suratt trial was
pending, the defense attorney assaulted the presiding judge as the judge descended from the
bench. The U.S. Supreme Court held that although the judge was justified in immediately
disbarring the attorney from practice before his own court, the judge could not summarily
disbar the attorney from practicing before other courts in the District of Columbia. Id. at
374-375. The attorney later sued the judge (unsuccessfully) over the illegal disbarment. See
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
120.
Rhode, supra note 8, at 499.
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committees," inevitably composed of persons with spotless backgrounds.
By the middle of the twentieth century, moral character investigations grew
to encompass such matters as divorce, cohabitation, 122 and even violation
of fishing license statutes. 123 While empirical research establishes no
correlation between "problem" applications and later disciplinary
proceedings, 124 the modem character and fitness process is viewed as an
important component in the maintenance of the legal profession's public
standing.

121.
See id. at 577. "Although current projections indicate that almost half of all
marriages will end in divorce, some examiners nonetheless find the experience indicative of
character difficulties." Id. at 578.
122.
Id. at 578-79 (stating that some committee members regard "living in sin" as an
unacceptable lifestyle). Among the questions asked at some hearings are the number of
bedrooms a couple has, the frequency with which they have sexual relations, and their
sexual relationships with other individuals. See id. at 579.
123.
See id. at 538 (citing interview with a member of Michigan's Board of Bar
Examiners).
See D. Larkin Chenault, It Begins With Character...,77 MICH. B. J. 138, 139
124.
(1998) (citing tracking in Michigan).

